A perspective on monetary policy by Sandra Pianalto
to what several countries have chosen as
their working definition of price stability.
For the sustainable growth goal, the
approach is not quite as precise. The gen-
eral idea is that monetary policy should
do what it can to support the expansion
of gross domestic product, or GDP, near
its “potential.” The tricky part is that the
economy’s potential growth rate can
change over time. Some changes are
temporary—such as when we have oil
price shocks. But some changes are more
permanent—for instance, when there are
major upward shifts in productivity.
These changes can make it difficult to
measure potential GDP. 
Although we have more than one goal, I
believe that in the long run, maintaining
price stability is the unique contribution
that the Federal Reserve can make to
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Since I became president of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland two
years ago, I have made a point of getting
out to various communities within our
region on a regular basis to talk with
business people—to hear what’s on their
minds and where they think the regional
economy is heading. It is important to
bring that regional input with me in my
role as national monetary policymaker. 
I have just completed my second year on
the Federal Open Market Committee, or
FOMC, which is the Federal Reserve’s
monetary policymaking group. We meet
eight times a year in Washington, D.C.
The voting members of the FOMC
include the seven members of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, and four of
the other eleven Reserve Bank presi-
dents. All of the presidents participate in
the policy discussions, but my voting
responsibility on the FOMC alternates
each year with the president of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Chicago. In 2004,
I had a vote, and this year Michael
Moskow, the Chicago president, votes
on FOMC policy actions. 
And that brings me to what I would like
to cover in my remarks to you today—a
brief perspective on monetary policy.
First, I will describe the FOMC’s goals
in setting monetary policy. Next, I will
talk about why we are moving the fed-
eral funds rate up from exceptionally
low levels. Finally, I will explain why, as
we adjust to a more normal economic
environment, we need to pay close atten-
tion to the risks for higher inflation.
The views that I express today are mine
alone. I do not presume to speak for any
of my FOMC colleagues. 
n  Monetary Policy Goals
Let me begin by telling you that con-
ducting monetary policy is more com-
plex than it might appear at first glance.
Economic conditions can be unpre-
dictable, so we need to find out which
policy choices have the best chance of
moving us toward our goals, given the
changing environment around us. 
Through the Federal Reserve Act, Con-
gress has instructed the Federal Reserve
to conduct monetary policy in support of
the nation’s economic goals. Specifi-
cally, Congress requires the FOMC “to
promote effectively the goals of maxi-
mum employment, stable prices, and
moderate long-term interest rates.” In
our press releases, we refer to these
requirements in shorthand as “price sta-
bility and sustainable growth.”
You will notice that there are no precise
numerical definitions here. Even so, if
we want to be successful in realizing
these goals, we have to make them more
concrete for operational purposes.
For the price stability goal, the FOMC
tends to focus on the growth rate of the
core Personal Consumption Expenditure
price index, or PCE price index. The
core PCE price index is a measure of
average consumer prices, excluding the
food and energy components, which
tend to fluctuate quite a lot. It appears
that the core PCE price index will come
in at about 1
1/2 percent for 2004, and
most forecasters suggest that pace will
continue in 2005. Inflation around 
1
1/2 percent, if sustained, appears closepromoting maximum employment and
moderate long-term interest rates. In
many, if not most cases, this is true in
the short run as well. The bottom line is
that you cannot have maximum employ-
ment and moderate long-term interest
rates without price stability. 
n  Moving from Unusual Levels 
of Policy Accommodation
Now that I’ve discussed our goals, let
me turn to the primary policy tool we
use—the federal funds rate. When you
boil down monetary policy, you find out
that the Federal Reserve supplies the
banking system with a highly liquid
form of money, which banks hold as
balances on deposit with us. Banks can
buy and sell these funds in the money
market, but since we control the supply,
we essentially set the price. That price is
the federal funds rate, the interest rate
that banks pay for overnight funds.
By targeting a specific federal funds
rate, the FOMC influences the level of
other interest rates and the quantity of
bank lending. Changes in the federal
funds rate trigger a chain of events that
affect other short-term interest rates,
foreign exchange rates, long-term inter-
est rates, and the amount of money and
credit. Ultimately, interest rate changes
affect a range of economic variables,
including employment, output, and
prices of goods and services. 
Since last June, the FOMC has
increased its target federal funds rate
from an extremely low level of 1 per-
cent to its current level of 2.25 percent.
We have increased that rate by 25 basis
points at each of our last five meetings,
and the federal funds futures market
shows a 95 percent probability that the
FOMC will increase the federal funds
rate target by another 25 basis points at
our next meeting on February 2.
I’d like to give you a bit of history of
how we got to the low level of 1 per-
cent, and explain why the federal funds
rate is trending up.
We had a brief and mild recession in
2001, followed by a slow and prolonged
recovery period. By early 2003, the
economy was being confronted by an
unusual combination of forces: The
nation was launching the war in Iraq,
energy markets were volatile, and busi-
ness confidence was low. At the same
time, productivity growth stayed strong,
adding to forces that were keeping infla-
tion at low levels. It almost seemed like a
perfect storm of uncertainty in how eco-
nomic conditions would unfold. 
Soon, though, we had enough informa-
tion to conclude that we faced a remote
but unacceptable risk—the risk of “an
unwelcome fall in inflation.” With inter-
est rates already low and the economy
struggling to regain its momentum, it
seemed possible that short-term interest
rates could fall to zero and that we could
experience an outright deflation. This
possibility was unprecedented in our
recent experience. Economists may dis-
agree about the potential effects of
deflation on spending, production, and
investment, but we know that actual
deflations are rare and we think they are
best avoided. 
By June of 2003, the FOMC had cut the
federal funds rate target to 1 percent—
the lowest level it had reached since the
late 1950s. We wanted to head off further
disinflation. I think that by focusing on
our price stability goal—in this case not
letting the price level actually decline—
our actions also promoted sustained eco-
nomic growth.
We did not have the data to confirm it at
the time, but it turns out that the econ-
omy had already begun to improve. It
strengthened more in the second half of
2003. Employment growth remained
sluggish, but investment spending
jumped. In turn, market interest rates
rose sharply, and did not retreat for the
balance of the year. 
The Committee still took a cautionary
stance. Although we judged the proba-
bility of an unwelcome disinflation as
fairly small by the end of 2003, we
decided to keep the funds rate target
low—or, as we stated in our press
release, keep monetary policy accom-
modative—to support the ongoing eco-
nomic expansion. Strong productivity
growth provided some extra confidence
that inflation would remain benign.
By the first half of 2004, the expansion
seemed to be on firmer ground. Growth
was solid, investment was largely hold-
ing up, and at long last employment
growth appeared to be on the rebound.
At the same time, we had to begin to
consider the possibility that inflationary
pressures could rise if monetary policy
did not respond appropriately. After all,
the deflation concern had now passed
and our policy was still highly accom-
modative. So last June, we began mov-
ing the federal funds rate up. 
It all boils down to changing economic
circumstances. In 2003, the FOMC
faced an unusual situation that caused us
to adopt a highly accommodative pol-
icy—meaning that we wanted to provide
plenty of liquidity at a low price. Since
the middle of last year, we have been
removing that accommodation gradu-
ally, causing an increase in short-term
interest rates. How far will we go? 
That all depends on how the economy
evolves.
n  Moving to a More Normal
Environment 
As the new year begins, I expect to find
the economy growing on a more sus-
tained path. The FOMC is adjusting to
this more normal environment. I believe
we are moving toward a more “neutral”
monetary policy, one that is neither
accommodative nor restrictive. 
My way of thinking about neutral does
not imply a particular numerical resting
place for our policy target. I want to
emphasize that our knowledge of the
economy is not precise enough to
encourage me to latch onto a specific
number for the federal funds rate. If the
economy strengthens further this year—
and I hope it will—market interest rates
are likely to rise as business and con-
sumer confidence takes hold, and spend-
ing will increase along with growing
production and employment. Under
these circumstances, maintaining the
same policy stance will probably mean
that the federal funds rate will have to
rise, too. In other words, interest rates
can go up without changing the stance
of monetary policy. 
Of course, there are differences of opin-
ion on how much rates will need to rise
at any given time. Over time, central
bankers have learned some important
lessons—namely, that there is a lot of
inertia in the inflation process, and that
we cannot underestimate the possibility
of inflation creeping in. And once an
inflationary psychology takes hold, it
can be difficult and costly to reverse. 
I recognize that on the surface, some of
the recent price statistics might seem to
present little cause for alarm. For exam-
ple, even though the overall PCE price
index increased by 2.6 percent during
the past 12 months, the core PCE price
index increased by only 1.5 percent. AsI mentioned earlier, this is roughly con-
sistent with a working definition of
price stability. We also see few signs
that labor costs are increasing signifi-
cantly faster than productivity, a devel-
opment that often can signal a step-up
in inflationary pressures. 
But in my opinion, the momentum in
the inflationary process has clearly
shifted away from disinflation. And,
unfortunately, it is not always possible
to distinguish short-term movements in
the price indexes from the emergence of
an inflationary trend until after the fact. 
We know that as the expansion length-
ens, and rates of resource utilization
tighten, the demand for credit tends to
increase, which pushes real interest
rates up. This is just a normal cyclical
phenomenon. In these circumstances,
monetary policymakers have to antici-
pate the potential for inflation to creep
up over time if the policy rate does not
move up as well—in other words, if
policy unintentionally becomes accom-
modative. 
The minutes from our December
FOMC meeting reflect this thinking.
Even though we have been moving
rates higher at a measured pace during
the past six months, we still see signs
that the current level of the real federal
funds rate target remains below the
level that is most likely needed to keep
inflation stable and economic output at
its potential.
Business cycle developments are not
the only factors that can affect real
interest rates. Looking ahead, I see the
potential for additional pressures on
market interest rates coming from two
other sources. One variable is our fed-
eral budget deficit. It is too simplistic to
claim that fiscal deficits necessarily
lead to higher interest rates. The eco-
nomic impact of any given deficit
almost certainly depends on the spend-
ing and tax policies that give rise to the
budget shortfall—the fine print beneath
the red ink, as it were. But it would not
be shocking to find that there might be
some interest-rate pressure from this
source, at least in the short run.
The foreign sector provides another
potential source of real interest rate
pressure. Capital flows from abroad
have helped to hold market interest rates
in check. Imports have been meeting
domestic demand that would otherwise
have to be satisfied out of U.S. produc-
tion. If foreign sources for financing our
consumption and investment shrink,
then it would be logical to see greater
upward pressures on interest rates in the
financial markets, as long as overall
economic growth remains solid. 
Regardless of the source, upward pres-
sure on real interest rates will change
the stance of monetary policy unless
our nominal monetary policy targets are
adjusted higher as well. Recognizing
how difficult it is to know when policy
is truly neutral, I think it is prudent to
move the federal funds rate up to a
position that gives me more confidence
that monetary policy is no longer
accommodative. I would prefer this
strategy to finding out the hard way—
for example, through a deterioration in
inflation expectations or in the inflation
picture itself—that we had maintained
an overly accommodative stance for 
too long.
n  Conclusion
I have explained why the federal funds
rate is trending up and how the FOMC
has kept its focus on our fundamental
policy goals. Economic trends are noto-
riously difficult to predict, and there are
always surprises. I know that during my
two years as a member of the FOMC, I
have seen more than a few twists and
turns in the path. But in every sense, the
Federal Reserve begins with the end in
mind—to maintain price stability and
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